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Despite the fact that multinational companies (MNCs) in Central Eastern Europe significantly 
contribute to employment growth in the region, qualitative knowledge about diffusion of 
employment practices in this region, and about coordination of MNCs with local labour market 
actors and institutions is still limited. This paper aims to fill this gap by underlining the coordination 
between MNCs, local actors, and international actors in shaping employment practices, their 
diffusion from headquarters to the workplace level, and their adaptation to local conditions in 
Poland. The goal is to explain MNC-driven adjustment to local conditions in employment practices 
of production workers and industrial relations through which this goal can be achieved. To explain 
this, we apply several coordination games between management and trade unions in the empirical 
part of the paper. 
We argue that the MNC’s corporate intention to utilise local conditions, the interactive 
coordination of the factory management with the local trade union, and an underdeveloped 
international coordination of trade unions within the MNC are the main factors explaining the 
specific local employment practices and industrial relations instead of their diffusion from MNC 
headquarters or other subsidiaries.  
 
Key words: multinational companies, coordination, applied game theory, employment practices, 
industrial relations, trade unions  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Multinational companies (MNCs) belong to organisations functioning simultaneously in various 
countries and labour markets. Lately, the diffusion of employment practices within MNCs has been 
at the centre of interest for researchers in the field of industrial relations and human resource 
management (HRM). Despite a great interest in this topic, not enough attention has been devoted 
to the interaction between MNCs and local actors, such as trade unions, that shape the diffusion 
process. Studying procedural interaction, or coordination, between these actors is then a 
constructive analytical tool in understanding the dynamics of diffusion.  
 
This paper presents an actor-oriented approach to study diffusion of employment practices in 
MNCs and qualitatively explores employment flexibility and industrial relations in a Polish factory of 
Electra – a leading Western-European industrial MNCTP1
PT. Electra belongs to important employers in 
Poland; yet the Polish business environment, industrial relations and employment practices 
considerably differ from its home country with a rather heavily regulated labour market. Besides 
investigating to what extent employment practices in the subsidiary are diffused from headquarters 
or adapted to local conditions, the paper’s aim is to demonstrate the role of coordination between 
actors that have an impact on employment practices in the Polish site: MNC headquarters, the 
factory management, workers and their trade union, Homeland trade unions, and the European 
Works Council (EWC). This model allows not only an explanation of the outcomes of interaction 
(i.e. developments in working time, pay, and bargaining structures), but also a straightforward 
analysis of actors’ strategies. In this context, the paper offers several new analytical tools and 
empirical findings. 
 
The paper’s second section provides a short literature overview on diffusion of employment 
practices, followed by an explanation of the coordination model of this study in section three, and 
hypotheses and research methodology in section four. Section five introduces the studied company. 
Empirical evidence and analysis of coordination channels are presented in section six. The seventh 




                                                  
TPT1
TPT Due to confidentiality, we refer to the company, its organisational units, home country and the location of the Polish factory 
by pseudonyms. M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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2. DIFFUSION OR ADAPTATION OF EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES TO 
LOCAL CONDITIONS?  
 
A variety of authors conceptualised diffusion for different MNCs. The most important approaches 
can be summarised in three points:  
 
First, different MNCs can be viewed as innovators, adaptors or reverse diffusers (Marginson, 1992; 
Ferner and Varul, 2000). Innovator companies diffuse employment practices from headquarters to 
foreign subsidiaries in countries where local labour market and employment conditions differ from 
the MNC’s home country (ibid.). Adaptor MNCs prefer adaptation of employment practices to local 
host-country conditions instead of diffusing common policies from the center (ibid.). Reverse 
diffusion (Edwards, 1998; Ferner and Varul, 2000) takes place if employment practices originating in 
subsidiaries are transferred back to the MNC’s home country.  
 
Second, Edwards, Rees and Coller (1999) discuss structural and political determinants of diffusion. 
Structural factors include the country of origin effect (Ferner, 1997), degree of international 
production integration, international management structures, and the method by which an MNC has 
grown. Besides the structure, political processes within MNCs - based on power resources of both 
the headquarters and the subsidiary – can foster or block diffusion.  
 
The third conceptualisation stresses the difference between diffusion outcomes and principles, and 
methods of diffusion. Boyer et al. (1998) argue that various combinations of methods and principles 
can lead to selective adaptation to local conditions, or in other words, to hybridisation trajectories 
preferred by MNCs.    
 
Despite the usefulness of the above concepts, more attention should be paid to the fact that 
whether the company’s choice for diffusion or adaptation materialises in specific employment 
practices depends on the strategic interaction of several actors, including MNC headquarters, local 
subsidiary management, and trade unions. The coordination model presented in this paper focuses 
on interaction between the local and the transnational, and is therefore a constructive analytical tool 
to better understand how and why diffusion of employment practices in MNCs does (not) take 
place. 
 M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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3. THE COORDINATION MODEL 
 
Coordination is a procedural interaction between actors, concerning priorities and issues of interest 
of all actors involved; relative to the institutional environment where coordination takes place 
(Scharpf, 1997). The most important features of coordination are discussed below. 
 
First, actors are at the centre of each coordination process. As employment practices are collectively 
regulated in industrial relations and at the same time are a crucial aspect of company HRM, it is 
important to consider coordination between the management, employer representatives, 
employees, and employee representatives. Second, actors interact in coordination channels. This 
paper investigates three coordination channels that are central in shaping workplace-level 
employment practices in the Polish Electra factory (see also Figure 1): 
α – coordination between MNC headquarters and the factory management;  
β – coordination between the factory management and employees and trade unions (HRM and 
industrial relations);   
δ – (international) cooperation of employee representatives: trade unions and the EWC.  
Besides these channels, national legal regulation affects employment practices, but as we are 
preliminarily concerned with actors’ strategies and interactions, we will integrate the legal impact 
into actors’ power resources. 
 
























Trade unions and 
employee 
representatives 
Employees and factory 
trade union   
α α  δ δ 
ß ß   M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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The third feature of coordination is the institutional context: actors define their strategies based on 
their perceptions of existing institutions and relatively to other actors’ strategies and opportunities 
fostered by the local institutional set-up (Scharpf, 1997).  
 
Fourth, the content of coordination refers to specific employment practices that are the subject of 
regulation, diffusion, or adaptation: this research focuses on headcount, working time, work 
organisation, and contract flexibility of production workers (which are called ‘directs’) in MNCs. 
These variables are the core of employment flexibility and are subject to legal regulation and 




Fifth, the institutional environment and the type of actors shape the constellation of actors and their 
strategies in coordination. MNCs possibly have different employment strategies in a lightly regulated 
Polish labour market with decentralised trade unions when compared to centralised industrial 
relations in Western Europe. We distinguish between strategies of non-coordination and 
coordination.TP2
PT Non-coordination refers to a situation where two or more actors do not interact 
with each other. Coordination can be further divided into cooperative and tough strategies. This 
dichotomy summarises the gamut of strategies actors can opt for in an analytically convenient way. 
Cooperation is a form of coordination when the actor is more inclined to compromise with other 
actors in the coordination process. Analogically, tough is a strategy when actors do not resign or 
compromise easily. Later in this paper, we will return to these strategies regarding several forms of 
flexibility. 
  
Sixth, the constellation of actors is the basis for the mode of coordination, reflecting the power 
resources attributed to actors and the stability of resulting employment practices: 
Coordination by control: entails power of an actor to take decisions and impose these on others 
(CPB, 1997:57). The strengths of control are certainty, enforcement, protection against 
opportunism of other actors, and no need for consultation with a variety of actors. Control may 
invoke rent-seeking behaviour or restriction of individual freedoms. Effective exercise of control 
involves high costs of information gathering (ibid.). Control is associated with legislation, a court 
order or an army (CPB, 1997). In MNCs, implications of control include, for example, headquarter 
control over a subsidiary’s business processesTP3
PT. An actor aiming to exercise control prefers a tough 
                                                  
TPT2
TPT  Legal regulation applies to working time, recruitment/dismissals, and contracts. The law does not regulate work organisation, 
but health and safety regulations apply. 
TPT3
TPT See Harzing (1999) Analysing Employment Practices in Western European Multinationals: Coordination, Industrial Relations and Employment Flexibilitiy in Poland 
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strategy; an actor as a control object is either cooperative or tough, depending on his/her power 
resources. 
Coordination by competition: entails rivalry between actors striving for something that not all can 
obtain (CPB, 1997:56). Competition can achieve efficient allocation and provide incentives for 
individual flexibility, freedom and privacy. Competition may also lead to rent seeking, decrease 
commitment of actors to long-term agreements, and produce a socially unacceptable income 
distribution (ibid.). Competition is observed in market interactions dominated by price signals. 
Within a company, competition can occur between actors on the same level of hierarchy, i.e. 
between a unionised and a non-unionised workforce. The strategies of actors in competition are 
tough, since all actors are assertive in reaching their goals. Actors can achieve a consensus at the 
price of large concessions and (threats of) industrial action. 
Coordination by common values and norms: congruent set of preferences within a group of people 
(CPB, 1997:57). Repeated interaction fosters solidarity, consensus, and common values in a 
community or a company. Actors are strongly motivated and committed to achieve their common 
goal: complying with common values and norms decreases opportunistic behaviour. Company 
culture is an example of common values, but value sharing is present in virtually all coordination 
channels, i.e. common local interests of management and unions, or international trade union 
solidarity. Cooperation is the most adequate strategy in this mode of coordination. 
Coordination by interactive bargaining or cooperative exchange: bargained consultation and 
cooperation between otherwise independent parties with different preferences (CPB, 1997:58). 
Emergent trust between actors, or their position vis-à-vis each other based on the institutional 
environment in which they operate, are crucial elements in this type of coordination. Due to an 
increased flow of information between actors, their knowledge about each other’s situation 
increases and mutual learning raises the quality of coordination and improves its effectiveness. 
Actors are motivated to stay alert, innovative, and will exploit existing opportunities in order to 
achieve their goals. Supplier relationships and industrial relations are examples of interactive 
bargaining (ibid.). In a company, bargaining can occur in all mentioned coordination channels, i.e. 
between headquarters and the subsidiary, or collective bargaining with trade unions. Both 
cooperative and tough strategies can be applied, depending on actors’ power resources.  
 
Next, instruments of coordination refer to tools through which specific outcomes concerning 
coordination contents are implemented with respect to the mode of coordination through which 
these outcomes were achieved. For example, control of management over the workforce can be 
implemented in a form of individual performance-related appraisals, but also as a control of selection 
in job upgrading.  M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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Finally, outcomes of coordination can be conceptualised in the form of diffusion of employment 
practices or their adaptation to local conditions.   
 
Based on this model, we empirically investigate the functioning of coordination relevant for 
workplace-level employment flexibility and industrial relations in a single MNC case study. We raise 
the following research question: What is the mode and the form of coordination in each of the 
distinguished channels, and how does  coordination affect the development of factory-specific 
employment practices? Related to that, we ask whether we can speak about diffusion of employment 
practices, or rather of their adaptation to local conditions.  
 
Our aim is to learn which mode of coordination dominates which coordination channel, what 
strategies best characterise the actors and their payoffs, what employment practices arise as a 
consequence of such interactions, and whether these resemble diffusion or adaptation to local 
conditions. Since a particular coordination channel is not described exclusively by one mode of 
coordination but can simultaneously embody several modes of coordination depending on its 
content and instruments, we were concerned with the dominant mode of coordination that best 
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4. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To answer our research question, we formulate three hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 1 – coordination between Electra headquarters (Homeland) and the Polish factory (α):  
In order to fulfil corporate targets of the MNC, we expect the headquarters to control the factory’s 
performance through a diffusion of employment practices:  fostering regular contacts with the 
factory management, deploying specified employment policies to the workplace and closely 
monitoring their implementation, and using expatriates and central decisions to control the 
employment practices.  If control by headquarters is the dominant coordination mode in channel α, 
headquarters will opt for a tough coordination form. At the same time, the factory management is 
expected to act in a cooperative manner because of its dependence on the headquarters. Control 
then is supported by common company values. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – coordination between the Polish factory management and the factory-based trade 
union representing workers (β): 
We distinguish between coordination outcomes (directs’ employment practices) and the 
coordination process (industrial relations). In both of these, we expect interactive bargaining to be 
the dominant coordination mode between the factory management and the local trade union. The 
expected management’s action is determined by headquarter control (hypothesis 1 above); 
however, we assume that local managers have a better knowledge of social processes at the factory 
level than the distant headquarters, and therefore can better evaluate the usefulness of local 
conditions for the company goals – either unilaterally, or via coordination with the local union. 
Factory-level compromises are then achieved in a form of coordination in which both the 
management and the union play with a tough bargaining strategy. Interactive bargaining is enabled 
through additional coordination channels determining managerial and union strategies in the factory: 
expected managerial control over the workforce driven by high unemployment in the region; 
competition between non-unionised and unionised workforce driven by the management; and 
common values of management and the union to prevent the factory’s relocation. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – transnational coordination of unions, employee representatives, and the relationship 
between employees and unions (δ): 
Homeland trade unions do not directly benefit from the relocation of Electra’s production to 
Poland; therefore, we presume that the dominant coordination mode of these trade unions will be M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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cooperation with trade unions in Poland, supported by value sharing and international solidarity, in 
order to increase the Polish unions’ power resources vis-à-vis employers. Unions both in the West 
and in Poland are expected to have cooperative strategies. The same is expected for employee 
representatives within the EWC.  
 
The main research method to examine the above hypotheses was qualitative interviewing using 
semi-structured questionnaires. In 2004, the first author conducted 42 interviews with managers, 
trade union representatives, EWC representatives, and external respondents at Electra’s 
headquarters and in the Polish factory. Figure 2 lists the interview respondents. 
 
Figure 2:   Interview respondents 
 
Organisational level  Respondents, number of interviews 
Management subsidiary  General manager (1); HR manager (7); HR specialist (5); Production 
managers (3); Corporate communication manager (1); Shift leaders 
(4) 
Headquarters Poland  Country HR manager  (1); Industrial HR manager (1) 
Business unit: HR manager (1); Industrial strategy manager (1)  
Product Division: International HR audit specialist (1) 
Headquarters Homeland 
Regional: Industrial relations manager Europe (1) 
Factory trade union   Trade union leader (6) 
Regional trade union   Trade union leader (1) 
National trade union   International coordinator (1)  
Other site’s trade union and EWC 
Poland 
Trade union leader (1)  
Trade Union Homeland, EWC  Electra trade union leader (1); EWC representative (2) 
External  Wilno Labour Market Board Director (1); Investment and 
development specialist, Wilno Municipality (1); Former production 
worker Electra Wilno (1) 
 
Managers and trade union representatives on all relevant levels of the hierarchy were interviewed. 
All interviews but one took place in the respondents’ offices without participation of third persons. 
All interviews were tape-recorded; one interview lasted on average 65 minutes. The first author 
also collected company statistics, reports and presentations, and visited the factory’s shop floor. 
Participation in a company event enabled the author to also observe informal interaction i.e. 
between managers and trade union leaders in a casual environment. 
 
In the next section of this paper, we provide empirical evidence and analyse the studied 
coordination channels. We start with a brief description of Electra, its Polish factory, and the 
factory-level industrial relations.    
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5. THE ELECTRA COMPANY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS    
 
Electra is one of the world’s largest industrial companies in the relevant sector and the largest in 
Europe, according to the amount of sales in 2003. Electra employs over 164,000 employees in over 
60 countries (EIP Briefing Document, 2004). Facing the challenges of internationalisation of markets 
and increased competition, Electra has undergone several reorganisations in the past 15 years. Being 
organised in a top-down hierarchy, the current corporate strategy stresses integration of various 
levels and activities, which requires a development of a cooperative culture to capture convergence 
opportunities (Electra EWC, 2001). Therefore, coordination channels transcending the traditional 
organisational structure are fostered mainly in core business activities and support activities, 
including HRM of knowledge workers and managers. 
 
In Poland, Electra belongs to important Western-European investors employing over 10,000 
employees in Electra sites (mostly manufacturing jobs), and more than 10,000 through local 
suppliers. The access to a relatively large Polish market, favourable local conditions, political stability, 
legal regulation, Polish employment practices, and the corporate strategy contributed to a gradual 
expansion of Electra in Poland during the1990s. Electra Industries Poland (EIP) in Wilno - the factory 
under scrutiny in this paper – is one of the four European manufacturing sites within Electra’s 
Business Unit BU C2 (see Figure 3). This mass assembly centre of consumer goods mainly for 
European markets was established as a greenfield site in 1990TP4
PT in Wilno, a city of 45,000 inhabitants 
in Northern Poland. EIP experienced gradual production growth and attracted a number of suppliers 
to the Wilno industrial park. The overall flexibility of this factory, including an outstanding 
production and workforce flexibility, cost competitiveness, and high product quality, account for 
EIP’s world-class performance vis-à-vis other Electra factories and competitors. In 2002, a major 
reorganisation and outsourcing of two (out of three) factories took place. This reorganisation did 
not significantly affect employment in any of the concerned factories, because the majority of 
Electra’s suppliers had already adopted a similar flexibility model due to supply-chain 
interdependence with Electra. Creating over 4,500 jobs mainly in production, EIP and its suppliers 
gradually became the second largest employer in the city of 27.2% unemploymentTP5
PT. With its 
reputation as an industrial hub, Wilno is a positive outlier when compared to neighbouring counties 
where unemployment levels reach 30 – 40%.TP6
PT  
The factory also maintains a functioning system of workplace industrial relations. The EIP’s trade 
union was established in 1996, several years after the plant’s establishment. After two unsuccessful 
                                                  
TPT4
TPT The current functioning of the factory dates back to 1995. 
TPT5
TPT In total, MNCs created around 90% of all jobs in Wilno and its surroundings (Regional labour market board Wilno) 
TPT6
TPT Official figures as of 31.3.2004 (Regional labour market board Wilno) M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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attempts, a group of 10 female directs convinced other workers that a union would be useful in 
order to improve work conditions. The union became part of Solidarnosc, and was accepted by 
EIP’s management without reservations. The unionisation level at EIP is about 30%, twice as high as 
the Polish averageTP7
PT, with the majority of union members being directs. Since the union is based 
inside the factory, frequent informal interaction with workers and (potential) members is well 
developed and the union does not face a membership decline.  
 
Gradually, both EIP management and the union learned to interact with each other. Originating in a 
country with centralised sectoral and company collective bargaining, even the expatriate managers at 
EIP did not have considerable experience in factory-level bargaining with unionsTP8
PT. Electra 
headquarters did not interfere in the process of building up industrial relations at EIP Wilno; 
therefore, rules of management-union interaction developed almost exclusively on the site. As the 
outcome, both bargaining parties respect the jointly established rules and avoid (threats of) 
industrial action, with a single exception of a collective conflict solved by a court mediator in 1998. 
Moreover, Polish Electra managers appreciate the unions’ awareness of business processes, which 
allows productive union–management interaction in business-related and employment-related issues. 
Although both managers and unionists view their relationship as open and friendly, and claim to have 
decent industrial relations, evidence suggests that coordination between the parties is to a certain 
extent based on tough strategies. The union’s strategy is to keep employment in Wilno, increase 
employment security and relate to that increase its control over the workforce. This strategy is 
linked to the fact that high unemployment in the region allows considerable power asymmetry 
between management, workers, and the union. Since dual employment flexibility became the 
factory’s priority only in the years, when the union was already functioning, it is likely that managers 
saw an opportunity to channel employment flexibility measures to the directs via the relatively weak 
trade union.   
 
Already for several years, the most important content of union-management interaction includes 
negotiations on work regulations, annual working time calendars and their operational revisions, and 
annual salary increases. The rule to discuss all changes in the calendar with the union was established 
locally and is based on the legal stipulation that working time issues are subject to such negotiation. 
According to the union, directs better accept decisions as to whether they will work or not on 
certain days (in case of min-max workers) if the union approves such decisions. Besides the working 
time, annual salary negotiations are a crucial part of management-union coordination. The concluded 
                                                  
TPT7
TPT See Kahancová (2003) 
TPT8
TPT Source: EIP expatriate managers. 
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agreements apply to all factory employees, except the management team and several key position 
holders. Such agreements are signed in a written form, however, not in the form of a collective 
agreement, and without an effective sanction mechanism in case of non-implementation of agreed 
stipulations. The non-existence of collective agreements at EIPTP9
PT allows for managerial freedom in 
operational decisions, as well as for an implementation of performance-related pay that is part of the 
direct workers’ monthly salary.  
 
After this brief introduction of the case study, we will now turn to analysing the relevant 
coordination channels that influence employment practices in the Polish factory.  
                                                  
TPT9
TPT Out of eight Electra sites in Poland, only two sites conclude a collective agreement. Interview Electra Poland industrial HR 
manager (18.6.2004) M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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6. ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION CHANNELS 
 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence on the functioning of coordination between 
headquarters, the factory management, and employee representatives, and on factory-specific 
employment practices that are the outcome of studied coordination. 
 
6.1 COORDINATION BETWEEN MNC HEADQUARTERS AND THE FACTORY 
MANAGEMENT (CHANNEL  α) 
 
From the MNC’s organizational chart, two coordination channels can be identified between Electra 
headquarters and the Polish factory (see Figure 3): first, it is the functional channel through the 
product division and the business unit; second, it is the regional channel via European and Polish 
headquarters.  
 

























Source: authors’ summary based on company documents and interviews 
 
According to acquired data we can conclude that there is a consistency in policies between different 
levels of headquarters (corporate, functional, and regional). Therefore, we restrict α only to 
coordination between functional headquarters and the EIP Wilno management.  
 
Direct coordination between headquarters and subsidiaries in employment practices materialises in 
standard systems of job grading, performance appraisals, management development plans, and 
Electra corporate headquarters 
Product Division A  Product Division B  Product Division C   Product Division D  Product Division E 
Business Unit C1   Business Unit C2   Business Unit C3 
Electra regional headquarters Europe 
Industrial site France  Industrial site Hungary  Industrial sites  
outside Europe 




BU C2  
Manufacturing/Operations M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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shared company values that penetrate managerial decisions on all organisational levels. The majority 
of existing central policies and control mechanisms that are diffused from the headquarters to 
subsidiaries relate to HRM of ‘indirects’ (managers, staff members): i.e. recruitment, training and 
internal labour market mobility. Headquarters are not directly involved in operational management, 
or control of the directs’ employment practices in the Polish siteTP10
PT. According to the HR manager, 
“anything [that] comes from headquarters normally refers to people above certain levels. […] These are 
people who are very far away from the production level. […] [Production] employees are not in the centre 
of interest of headquarters.” Similar to HRM, Electra does not have any corporate, product division or 
business unit principles and guidelines concerning industrial relations in the factories. The only 
relevant policy is the Polish headquarters’ Electra Social Policy in Poland. Although being an attempt of 
coordination, this policy further encourages decentralisation of industrial relations within Poland 
(EIP Briefing Document, 2004).  
 
Headquarters are not directly involved in any aspect of managing employment flexibility of directs 
on the site, and the EIP management has a remarkably large scope in HRM for autonomous action of 
directs.  This is shown in the absence of detailed policy guidelines on headquarter level concerning 
management of directs and industrial relations in the factories, a limited number of expatriates in 
Wilno (except the general manager, even the few expatriates that work at EIP have the goal to grow 
a local successor), no direct control of headquarters’ HR management over the factory HR 
managers, and no detailed reporting on industrial relations and employment practices of directs to 
headquarters. The instruments of coordination in this case include general audits, process survey 
tools and motivation surveys, covering both directs and indirects.  
 
From the analytical perspective, headquarters define the space for strategic action of EIP’s 
management by giving the management a large degree of freedom. This is explained by several 
arguments: first, as both headquarters and EIP are in a hierarchical relationship within one company, 
they share the same company values and the interest of maintaining EIP’s competitive position within 
the MNC. Both actors appear to have the same strategic objective to decentralise employment 
practices in local conditions. Second, assuming these same objectives, headquarters find it more 
reasonable to delegate local industrial relations and management of directs to the factory-level 
management, since the factory management’s knowledge of local conditions is considerably larger 
than the headquarters’. Due to limited knowledge of local conditions, headquarters face the risk of 
not choosing the most appropriate strategy in the ‘game’ with local trade unions. To avoid this risk, 
                                                  
TPT10
TPT The BU C2 headquarters control the factory’s total headcount. Working time matters are part of financial reporting, i.e. due 
to overtime payments. 
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headquarters let local managers decide their strategy vis-à-vis unions, according to their best local 
knowledge. As the outcome, the mode of interaction between headquarters and subsidiary 
management is not dominated by control over employment practices of directs and their 
instruments as was hypothesised, but by soft coordination through value sharing within one 
corporate culture. In other words, the MNC fosters decentralisation and adaptation to local 
conditions (this adaptation will be discussed in more detail below) through value sharing instead of 
control. The strategies of both headquarters and EIP management are cooperative.  
 
This finding contrasts with observations concerning employment practices of indirects that are 
considerably more regulated and diffused from the headquarter level to subsidiary levels. With a 
growing internal labour market within the MNC and the focus on knowledge workers as the 
company’s key asset, the trend of past years has been the centralisation of HRM of indirects either 
within a geographic region or within functional product divisions.TP11
PT Moreover, employment practices 
of indirects are often the subject of cross-factory benchmarking or coordination with Electra 
headquarters, although working time and pay are determined locally based on national laws and 
industrial relations. In contrast to directs, indirects’ management is to a large extent dominated by 
headquarter control and top-down diffusion. 
 
To sum up, no direct control of the headquarter occurs over either the Polish factory’s employment 
practices, HRM related to directs, or industrial relations. Our findings on the cooperative form of 
coordination and the lack of headquarter control over factory HRM and employment practices are 
in contrast with our hypothesis 1 and therefore this hypothesis is rejected. It is part of Electra’s 
overall strategy to decentralise employment practices of directs and adapt them to local conditions. 
However, in the case of EIP, we cannot speak about such adaptation, because EIP’s employment 
practices were developed exclusively at this factory, utilising local labour market conditions in 
combination with several best practice processes from other Electra factories TP12
PT. Working time and 
contract flexibility have gradually been implemented also at several EIP’s local suppliers, but without 
direct coordination with EIP. The involvement of other Electra subsidiaries in Poland and abroad in 
EIP’s HR management is also negligible. Thus, the management and the factory-based trade union are 
the key actors shaping employment practices at EIP Wilno. Their coordination is analysed in the 
next section.  
                                                  
TPT11
TPT Electra in Poland – through the country headquarters – tends to centralise recruitment and training of indirects for all sites. In 
Western Europe, Electra favours shared service centres for employment and training of indirects in countries or groups 
of countries with similar labour regulations.  
 
TPT12
TPT I.e. the mini-company concept was based on experience of a Western-European Electra factory M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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6.2 EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FACTORY 
MANAGEMENT AND THE LOCAL TRADE UNION (CHANNEL  β)  
 
Local conditions, including high unemployment, lack of job opportunities in the region and the 
availability of young, motivated workforce considerably increased EIP’s labour market authority. 
Although the company provides fair working conditions and payments to its workers, it comes at 
the expense of high employment flexibility that is, besides favourable labour costs, an important 
source of the factory’s competitiveness. The main aspects of employment flexibility related to 
directs include: headcount, contract structure, working time, and work organisation.   
 
First, the share of directs on the total headcount varies between 77 and 87% according to 
seasonalityTP13
PT. About 53% of directs and 74% of indirects are 25 to 35 years old; 49% of directs and 
52% of indirects are women, and the share of women in managerial positions is around 30%.TP14
PT The 
majority of directs finished secondary education and the majority of indirects have a university 
degree.TP15
PT The company does not formally distinguish between skilled and non-skilled directs.TP16
PT  
 
The production’s seasonality is directly reflected in directs’ employment flexibility: when the product 
demand falls in the first half of a calendar year, only part of the workforce operates; and in the year’s 
second half, when the demand rises, a large group of temporary workers is hired under the same 
working conditions as the permanent workforce. Many seasonal workers return to EIP every year in 
the winter, and work in farming in the summer. Electra’s good employer reputation in not 
discriminating between permanent and seasonal workers in pay, benefits and working conditions, 
higher pay compared to small local companies, and finally the company’s respect to the Polish labour 
law (whereas small local employers often evade the law)TP17
PT are factors that contribute to workers’ 
loyalty to EIP. The high motivation of directs to work at this factory simultaneously raises 
competition among them and extends control of the management over the workforce and over the 
labour market selection. A system of individual evaluations, used both for the temporary and the 
permanent workforce, is a continuous inspection of employee motivation and results. This 
evaluation of directs is conducted by their foremen and shift leaders and is decisive for position 
                                                  
TPT13
TPT EIP internal employment statistics (1997-2003). 
TPT14
TPT EIP internal employment statistics (2003). 
TPT15
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upgrading, an increased salary, change from temporary to permanent contracts, or a prospective 
temporary job in the next year’s season.  
In contrast to the contract flexibility of directs, indirects are relatively stable in number and contract 
structure (see Figure 4). 






Source: Authors’ calculation based on company statistics  
 
The structure of contracts is the second aspect of employment flexibility linking production plans with 
the number of directs. Since 2000, the share of full-time open-ended contracts has been gradually 
declining and has been substituted by long-term or short-term contracts with flexible working time. 
While in 2000, 42% of directs had full-time open-ended contracts, by 2003 this share decreased to 
only 2% while the share of open-ended and fixed-term contracts with half time or three-quarters time 
models increased: to prevent dismissals in the low season, the factory decreased full-time contracts 
to three-quarters time contracts. Although not favoured when production changes affect the workers, 
the union supported this decision. In general, EIP changes the contract type of expiring contracts 
only; and this policy proved to be successful in avoiding dismissals. 
 
The third aspect of employment flexibility is the working time of directs that has been developed 
locally, utilising Polish labour law. To secure the company’s ability to increase and decrease 
production output within short periods of time (on a weekly basis), min-max contracts have been 
deployed: workers are minimally paid for 50% of legally stipulated working time even if they stay at 
home due to low production plans. However, if production increases, these directs work according 
to the factory’s needs, whereas their working time varies between 50% and 100% of the standard 
40-hour-week. The workers are then paid according to the actual hours worked.  This arrangement 
decreases the employer’s financial burden and permits high flexibility. Acknowledging flexibility of 
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Finally, work organisation – directs’ allocation to production lines, seats, and their rotation – is the 
last studied aspect of employment flexibility. A group of multi-skilled employees, called butterflies, has 
been trained to avoid production stoppages in case of regular workers’ breaks or absence occurring 
anywhere in production. Moreover, directs work in mini-companies of 9-10 persons, and rotation 
within one’s mini-company is without limitations. The concept of mini-companies proved successful, 
especially for individual motivation and responsibility. A regular mini-company performance 
assessment and various awards (i.e. employee of the month) are stimulating factors for employees 
to improve their commitment to performance and quality. At the same time, this performance 
assessment is a tool of managerial control over the workforce, together with unilateral managerial 
decisions concerning directs’ contracts and working time.  
 
Although employment flexibility is an important source of EIP’s competitiveness, the union claims 
that “… a seasonal min-max contract negatively affects the psyche of a worker who does not know how 
much he will work and earn”. The union struggles for increased employment security, but the actual 
trend is a further increase in flexibility. Contracts of many employees with full-time temporary 
contracts have been substituted with min-max temporary contracts, thus, with inferior conditions 
and pay due for less hours worked annually. Moreover, workers are tied to Electra; as they do not 
know long enough in advanceTP18
PT when they will work, they cannot complement their half-time 
contract at EIP with a half-time job at another company (although the number of available jobs in the 
region is limited). Dual employment flexibility secures more jobs than in the case of a fixed 
headcount of full-time directs.  However, in the eyes of the union, flexibility decreases solidarity 
among directs and cultivates competition, hostility and informal networks on the shop floor. Despite 
attempts of the union to change these practices, the real effects seem to move in the opposite 
direction. The union’s unsuccessful efforts to increase employment security are related to limited 
patronage of higher-level union organisations and power resources of company-based trade unions 
in Poland. Contacts of the EIP-based union with regional and national Solidarnosc headquarters are 
limited to informal interaction and some regular meetings. The fact that industrial relations at EIP 
are better than at many other companies in the region further limits the union’s involvement in 
higher-level structures, because even the trade union prefers to solve all issues behind the gates of 
the factory. An informal network between union representatives of several Polish Electra factories 
does exist, but it has not lead to a harmonised or centralised decision-making. The unions would 
                                                  
TPT18
TPT Managers prepare work schedules on a monthly basis. Workers are informed one month in advance on which days and 
which shifts they will work. In case of operational changes or delays in production inputs, changes are adopted even 
more often (source: EIP shift leader). The union finds that workers are informed about their schedule too late; in some 
cases just 2 days ahead (source: EIP union leader). Analysing Employment Practices in Western European Multinationals: Coordination, Industrial Relations and Employment Flexibilitiy in Poland 
AIAS – UvA    29 
like to see more company-level centralisation – as in Electra in HomelandTP19
PT – but in Poland, a 
decentralised factory-level bargaining and utilisation of regional labour market differences prevails.  
 
To put the management-union coordination in channel β in more formalized turn, we use a basic 
game-theoretical methodology (Scharpf, 1997): we define actor constellations and payoffs relative to 
the actors’ constellations and to the institutional environment in which coordination takes place. 
Payoff matrices help us to relate findings in each studied coordination channel with our hypotheses. 
We list payoffs numbered from 0 to 3 for both management and the union, acknowledging the fact 
that coordination is a continuous process with repetitive interactions. The choice of numbers is 
based on convenience and the only relevant aspect of this selection is its ordinal structure based on 
empirical information. To find the expected outcome of actors’ coordination we adopt the Nash 
Equilibrium conceptTP20
PT where the equilibrium combination of strategies is the one from which none 
of the actors has incentives to deviate, given the strategies played by the other agents. This method 
is suitable, because the β channel differs from the α channel in that the actors are assumed to be 
independent from each other and are not in a hierarchic relationship.   
 
In the β channel, the autonomy of EIP’s factory management significantly affects the constellation of 
the factory management and the union. Both actors are relatively independent from their 
headquarters; therefore, coordination β is embedded in local conditions. We decompose β into 
three games played between the management and the union concerning: working time, contract 
flexibility, and work organisation. The constellation and strategy of both actors is determined by 
relatively weak trade union powers to influence employment practices and flexibility, and the non-
existence of collective agreements, which allowed EIP to develop the employment flexibility model 
conforming to Polish labour law, but at the same time, limiting trade union involvement in decisions 
concerning employment flexibility, except fields where union-management negotiations are legally 
stipulated (pay negotiations and working time negotiations). Furthermore, the strategy of 
management and the union is shaped by a common value to safeguard employment in Wilno. The 
union strategy is also based on the effort to increase union control over the workforce, and the 
management strategy is dominated by the factory’s effort to perform best when compared to other 
comparable factories within and outside Electra. 
 
                                                  
TPT19
TPT Although not part of sectoral bargaining, collective bargaining is centralised for all Electra sites in Homeland. 
TPT20
TPT Osborne and Rubinstein (1994: 14). M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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Figure 5 shows the union-management coordination for selected aspects of the β channel: 
 
Figure 5a.    Figure 5b.    Figure 5c. 
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In working time issues (Figure 5a), the union has relatively the largest power resource based on legal 
stipulations; therefore, it is a better strategy for management to cooperate with the union in 
working time issues, since by being tough the company can lose its reputation of a good employer, 
face court cases and suffer extra costs. For the union, it is also better to opt for cooperation as long 
as the management cooperates.  In this case, the Nash equilibrium game means that the 
management cooperates with the union on working time issues and adheres to institutions 
established because of the existence of effective legal sanctions for the employer. The fact that EIP 
management negotiates its annual working calendar and operational changes with the union supports 
this finding. The union appreciates this cooperation; however, if a company would opt for being 
tough, the union would also shift to being toughTP21
PT. This happened at the end of 2003 when the union 
and the management could not find a consensus concerning working time recognition of three 
individual workers. As a result, the union invited the Labour inspection and the management had to 
face effective sanctions. To sum up, the ‘cooperation–cooperation’ strategy is the most sustainable 
mode of coordination between EIP management and the trade union in working time issues. 
 
The constellation of actors and their payoffs in contract flexibility in Figure 5b differ from coordination 
related to working time, since the availability of skilled labour and high unemployment in the region 
increase the power of the management vis-à-vis the union. Although regulated by law, the union 
failed to extensively influence the contract structure. In this case, the equilibrium game played is 
‘tough-tough’: by being tough in respect to the union, EIP has the highest payoffs in the form of 
employment flexibility irrespective to union strategiesTP22
PT. As the union has to face a ‘tough’ employer, 
being tough is also a dominant strategy for the union. Through this, the union maximises at least the 
benefits it can reach with its weak position. For example, in 2003, in order to avoid dismissals of 
workers (which would have been the worst option for the union), the union opted for the second-
                                                  
TPT21
TPT For the union, ‘3’ means a higher payoff than ‘0’ in the right column of Fig. 5a. 
TPT22
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worst strategy and agreed to change contract types of full-time directs to three quarters time 
contracts.  
 
Work organisation, analysed in Figure 5c, differs from the previous two aspects in that no legal 
obligation to negotiate the work organization with trade unions applies. Therefore, the union has 
very limited powers in affecting the work organisation at EIP, because work organisation is a domain 
of management and the management’s responsibility is higher than the union’s responsibility. In this 
case, managers play a ‘tough’ strategyTP23
PT, to which the union optimally reacts by playing a tough 
strategy as well, in an attempt to maximise its payoff in this situationTP24
PT. Most of this interaction 
occurs through informal communication channels through which the union signals its eventual 
concerns related to work organisation. An effective sanction mechanism to penalise the company in 
case of no commitment to adopted contract structure or work organisation is not in place, since 
the company developed these employment flexibility measures internally and, in case of contract 
structure, according to Polish labour law.  
 
To integrate the previous arguments and to propose a broader view on the β channel, Figure 6 
shows a general payoff matrix applicable to factory-level industrial relations at EIP. The payoffs listed 
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As the figure suggests, both the EIP management and the union play a ‘tough–tough’ game, which 
suits the decentralised structure of Polish industrial relations: in this sustainable coordination model, 
the employer attempts to maintain its bargaining power over the relatively weak union, and the 
union is better off by maximising its possible gain relative to the existing power asymmetry.  
Nevertheless, the ‘tough–tough’ game does not mean that the actors experience conflicts; instead, 
they realise that better results can be reached through interactive bargaining with compromises, i.e. 
                                                  
TPT23
TPT Payoffs in the right column are higher than in the left column. 
TPT24
TPT In the right column,‘2’ is a higher payoff for the union than ‘1’. 
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operative changes in working time calendar of the factory achieved via mutual cooperation, 
adjustments in contract structure, and informal union feedback on work organisation. Although the 
union is relatively weak, EIP has a well functioning interaction with the union when compared to 
stylised local employers. Both the management and the union view this as an equilibrium model 
(relative to local conditions) where no major changes should be introduced in the relationship.  
 
Overall, looking back at the four figures related to management-union coordination (β) and 
returning to hypothesis 2 on the outcomes and the process of this coordination, we formulate 
several further insights: Regarding the outcomes of coordination, in employment practices EIP does 
not adapt to local conditions, but utilises these to the company’s flexibility needs. Given that 
sanction mechanisms are lacking, adaptation would mean that the company would be less concerned 
with the agreed rules. Second, adaptation would mean lower employment flexibility, which is the 
case in the majority of local and foreign employers not linked with Electra Wilno. Finally, with 
adaptation to local conditions, we would expect more open-ended contracts, and severance 
payments when dismissing employees with such contracts. Given these points, the conclusion is that 
β is neither diffusion, nor adaptation, but utilisation of local conditions through negotiated 
agreements and interactive bargaining with a relatively weak trade union, where being tough is the 
most sustainable strategy for both management and the union.  
 
We confirm hypothesis 2 also regarding the coordination process, and argue that industrial relations 
are characterised by interactive bargaining, with the union being recognised as a legitimate bargaining 
partner, although weaker than the management. MNCs have in this respect a good reputation in 
Poland in contrast to small foreign companies and Polish employers. The supporting coordination 
channels included in hypothesis 2 are also confirmed: we found management control over the 
directs through individual worker evaluations and selection procedures. In this case, management 
plays a tough strategy, and directs do not have any other option but to cooperate. However, we did 
not find evidence that management promotes competition between unionised and non-unionised 
workers; both groups are treated equally. Finally, we can confirm the existence of shared values 
between the union and managers; namely, the wish of both actors to maintain a well-performing 
factory, and commitment to jointly established rules. 
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6.3 INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION COORDINATION AND THE EUROPEAN 
WORKS COUNCIL (CHANNEL δ) 
 
International coordination of trade unions, the European works council at Electra, and the 
workplace-level union-workers relationship is the final coordination channel to be analysed. 
Opposite to our expectations, we find that regular international contacts among trade unions at 
Electra in Poland, Homeland, and other countries are limited. “National, international or global 
cooperation is not the first priority of [Homeland] workers and unions”TP25
PT. Electra’s Polish unions initially 
expected more cooperation with Western unions and were disappointed by the lack of interest 
from Homeland, however, they understand that “there are no sentiments in business”TP26
PT, especially 
when factories face internal MNC competition.  
 
The only functioning channel through which international cooperation is assured is the European 
works council (EWC); however, the relationship between representatives from Homeland and 
Poland in the EWC is competitive rather than cooperative. According to Western-European 
employee representatives, the role of EWC at Electra is limited to discussions dominated by Electra 
headquarters. This channel does not yet play a significant role in bridging local differences in 
structure and power of employee representatives. Despite its limited role, evidence suggests 
competition between involved representatives from Western Europe and CEE. 
 
In the recent years, international union cooperation at Electra has been more important than the 
EWC. Trade unions are expected to be more eager to cooperate internationally in order to 
decrease the threat of social dumping for Western European countries and the emigration of their 
industries to lower-wage countries in CEE (Scharpf, 1997: 81). Unions would prefer shared 
employment regulation standards that would decrease competition between Western and Eastern 
Europe. Cooperating with trade unions in CEE is the first step in how to eliminate the threat of 
competition. Although this argument is based on the cooperation of national-level trade union 
confederations, Figure 7 suggests a different picture for company-level union cooperation within 
Electra.  
                                                  
TPT25
TPT Source: union representative Electra Homeland. 
TPT26
TPT Source: international union coordinator Electra Poland. M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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According to payoffs in the matrix (based on interviews with trade union representatives, and 
challenges and threats that unions have to face), we identified two sustainable equilibrium outcomes: 
unions either cooperate with each other in order to lobby for higher regulation standards; or they 
compete with each other in order to maintain the local employment regulation and promote 
advantages of local variety. The first case characterises the national-level union cooperation; 
however, the evidence for company-level union cooperation at Electra supports the second option. 
Coordination between unions is dominated by competition, and Homeland Electra trade unions 
view Polish unions as a threat for employment stability in Homeland. Polish Unions in Electra’s 
Polish factories, including EIP Wilno, would prefer cooperation with Homeland unions and a higher 
employment security and centralised industrial relations like in Homeland, but being disappointed by 
Homeland unions’ attitudes they opted instead for competition and local industrial relations. In the 
eyes of Electra’s Polish union representatives, Homeland unions fought to prevent East-West union 
cooperation and even postponed the involvement of Polish representatives in the EWC until their 
inclusion became compulsory. Currently there is no regular contact between Electra unions in 
Homeland and Poland, and even if individual Homeland union leaders attempt to visit unionists in 
Polish Electra factories, their action faces opposition from Homeland union members. 
 
The next feature of the δ channel is the coordination between the workers and the union in the EIP 
factory. This relationship can be characterised by interactive bargaining with cooperative strategies, 
where feedback from workers concerns mainly their working time and contracts. A threat to the 
stable union position is a decreasing solidarity among workers that is driven by shop floor employee 
competition. Although this competition does not depend on union membership but is based on 
managerial control to increase individual performance of directs, it is a serious concern for the 
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To summarise the finding on δ, we conclude that international company-level trade union 
coordination is dominated by competition that further deepens the embeddedness of employment 
regulation into local conditions and supports the persistent institutional and structural variation in 
industrial relations between centralised Western Rhineland economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and 
decentralised CEE economies such as Poland. This argument runs against our hypothesis 3 on 
international union cooperation and solidarity. The EWC of Electra can possibly play this role in the 
future, but in the current state of cooperation the further development of this institution remains to 
be seen. Therefore, based on our current findings, hypothesis 3 is rejected.  
 
As our analysis suggests, the greatest impact on factory-specific employment practices is ascribed to 
the locally embedded coordination between the factory management and the factory trade union. 
The impact of both MNC headquarters and trade union headquarters is limited.  
 M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we showed the dominant modes and forms of coordination in three coordination 
channels, and evaluated the impact of these on factory-specific employment practices. However, 
before we turn to the concluding arguments, we must emphasise that each coordination channel can 
be simultaneously characterised by several modes of coordination. In other words, we can find 
control, competition, value sharing and interactive bargaining in all coordination channels. Figure 8 
summarises empirical evidence on the variety of coordination modes in each of the channels: 
Figure 8      Various modes of coordination in various coordination channels 
 
Mode of coordination  Channel  Actors involved and their 
coordination forms  Content/instruments of coordination 
α 
Electra headquarters: tough;                    
EIP Wilno management: cooperation 
(hierarchy)  
Autonomy of subsidiary in exchange for meeting production targets set by headquarters 
Management control over the workforce: individual worker evaluations and selections 
of workers with min-max working time based on evaluation of immediate supervisor;   β 
 
EIP Wilno management: tough;               
Workers: cooperation;                           
Trade union: tough 
  







Workers: tough;                                 
Trade union: cooperative 
Worker control over the trade union: shaping the union agenda through feedback and 
interaction with the union 
α  n/a;  not applicable to hierarchy 
β 
EIP Wilno management: tough;               
Trade union: tough 
Would apply if evidence on management discriminating between unionised and non-
unionised workers would have been found empirically 
Low international trade union solidarity within Electra, Homeland union members do 
not support union contacts with Polish representatives;  









Trade unions Homeland: tough;      




EIP workplace competition: low solidarity between workers, gossips, individual efforts 
to be the best in order to improve one’s performance evaluation, contract and working 
time model 
α 
Electra headquarters: cooperative;          
EIP Wilno management: cooperative 
Company culture; good reputation of Electra and the EIP factory as an employer;            
Adaptation of employment practices of production workers to local conditions 
β 
EIP Wilno management: cooperative;       
Trade union: cooperative;        
Workers: cooperative 
Common goal to keep the factory (and employment) in Wilno; mutual learning, avoiding 
conflicts that increase the chance of relocation  
COMMON VALUES AND NORMS 
 
 
δ  EWC representatives: cooperative  Sharing employee experiences within Electra; best practice across various European 
countries; exchange of information (limited empirical evidence)  
α 
Electra headquarters: tough;                   
EIP Wilno management: cooperation 
(hierarchy)  
Decisions concerning the factory allocation and/or relocation 
β 
EIP Wilno management: cooperative in 
working time issues, otherwise tough;    
Trade union: tough 
Union-management negotiations and bargaining over working time, contract 
structure, work organisation at the factory, based on Polish legal regulation 





Trade union: cooperative;       
Workers: cooperative/tough 
Worker feedback and (in)formal interaction with the union concerning working 
time models and contract structure 
 
For example, the coordination channel between EIP management and the trade union (β) can be 
characterised by interactive bargaining on issues of working time, but also by control and common 
values: the management does have certain leverage over the union because it provides facilities for 
union activity on the company campus. At the same time, management and the union share values 
concerning the factory’s performance in order to avoid production relocation and job losses at 
Wilno. As this example suggests, there is no exclusivity between various modes of coordination in 
different channels.  
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Since the strength of different coordination modes varies we found the dominant mode of 
coordination that best describes the channels α, β, and δ. We formulate three conclusions in 
response to our research question: 
 
First, in channel α we find that the production workers’ employment practices at EIP are not 
controlled by Homeland MNC headquarters and have been developed exclusively utilising local 
conditions including Polish labour law and the Wilno region’s labour market specificities. Although 
positive coordination and corporate value sharing dominate the relationship between Homeland 
headquarters and the EIP management, headquarters stay out of the process of managing 
employment practices at the Polish factory and grant a significant degree of autonomy to the local 
management. Consequently, local employment practices are an outcome of coordination between 
the management and the union in the factory, without involvement or control of third parties.  
 
Second, in the β channel we can speak neither about diffusion of employment practices, nor their 
adaptation to the local conditions. The factory’s management-union coordination is better viewed as 
interactive bargaining with mainly tough, but in certain cases also cooperative dominant strategies 
for both actors. The management aims at utilising local conditions and achieving a high degree of 
employment flexibility; whereas the union aims at increased job security. The power asymmetry 
between the management and the union in this coordination accounts for the fact that a growth of 
trade union power in shaping the factory’s employment flexibility has been effectively pre-empted by 
the management through utilisation of labour market conditions and the trade union structure in 
Poland.   
 
Finally, the δ channel, or the international cooperation of Electra’s trade unions in Homeland and in 
Poland, is dominated by competition, which further cultivates the embeddedness of industrial 
relations into local conditions and limits the influence of higher-level union organizations on local 
employment practices. Moreover, competing trade unions increase the space for the MNC’s 
strategic action and stimulate asymmetry in coordination between MNCs and employee 
representatives on the international level.  
 
The local embeddedness of industrial relations is not expected to alter considerably in the near 
future, despite important political changes currently taking place. Poland’s membership in the 
European Union will most likely not bring significant differences to the power relations between 
Electra headquarters, the factory management, and the trade union. The only important change is Analysing Employment Practices in Western European Multinationals: Coordination, Industrial Relations and Employment Flexibilitiy in Poland 
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the membership of Polish representatives in Electra’s EWC. Polish unions expect that their 
membership will produce improved international cooperation with Western unions on the 
company-level in order to better face global challenges. However, unions understand that this 
cooperation cannot shift the current equilibrium in the Polish factories to the unions’ benefits, 
because due to a greater international mobility of capital (compared to labour), MNCs always have a 
pool of potential host countries competing for foreign investments at hand.  
 
For MNCs like Electra, Poland will remain an attractive investment location provided that labour 
costs, labour markets, legal and political conditions, the current industrial relations climate, and 
trade unions’ awareness of global challenges will not change significantly. Other factors, such as 
changes on product markets may lead to an outsourcing of Polish factories, which is also the fate of 
the Wilno factory. Since previous outsourcing of two Electra sites in Wilno in 2002 barely produced 
any changes in employment-related issues, it is expected that the strategies, payoffs, and 
constellations of both managers and the trade union as described in this paper are sustainable in the 
current Polish labour market conditions. M. Kahancová, M. van der Meer 
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